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Abstract  
The aircraft fleet maintenance organisation is responsible for keeping aircraft in a safe, 
efficient operating condition. Through optimising the use of maintenance resources and the 
implementation of maintenance activities, fleet maintenance management aims to maximise 
fleet performance by, for example, ensuring there is minimal deviation from the planned 
operational schedule, that the number of unexpected failures is minimised or that maintenance 
cost is kept at a minimum. To obtain overall fleet performance, the performance of individual 
aircraft must first be known. The calculation of aircraft performance requires an accurate 
model of the fleet operation and maintenance processes. This paper aims to introduce a 
framework that can be used to build aircraft fleet maintenance models. A variety of CPN 
(coloured Petri nets) models are established to represent fleet maintenance activities and 
maintenance management, as well as the factors that have a significant impact on fleet 
maintenance including fleet operation, aircraft failure logic and component failure processes. 
Such CPN models provide an ideal structured framework for Monte Carlo simulation analysis, 
within which calculations can be performed in order to determine numerous fleet reliability 
and maintenance performance measures. 
Keywords: Maintenance, Decision Support Systems, Aircraft Fleet, Modelling Framework, 
Coloured Petri Nets  
1. Introduction  
Maintenance is often described as a set of actions carried out to restore a system or vehicle to 
the state in which it is able to continuously perform its intended functions or missions [1]. It 
relies on a variety of factors such as equipment, spares and personnel. In fleets of vehicles, 
such as aircraft, maintenance can be seen as a group of interrelated support structures whose 
purpose is to minimise interruptions to fleet operations. With this in mind, aircraft fleet 
maintenance is generally performed with the aim of increasing aircraft reliability by 
decreasing the number of unexpected aircraft failures and reducing the downtime of 
inoperative aircraft by ensuring effective repairs.  
Generally, aircraft maintenance can be split into two main types: corrective maintenance (CM) 
and preventive maintenance (PM). CM, also sometimes referred to as reactive or breakdown 
maintenance, includes all the maintenance actions that return unserviceable aircraft or 
components to operative states following an unscheduled arising. It is carried out after a 
failure and due to the random nature of failures cannot be planned, meaning that it is also 
often referred to as unscheduled maintenance. The primary objective of PM is to prevent 
unscheduled downtime or failures that would result in CM. PM is an effective way to extend 
the life of aircraft systems. PM can generally be divided into two categories: time-based and 
condition-based, which differ according to the variable used to decide when maintenance 
should be performed. Under a time-based PM procedure, maintenance tasks are performed at 
fixed, pre-determined intervals, which can be defined in terms of calendar time, flight time or 
cycles of operation. By contrast, condition-based PM, also known as predictive maintenance, 
takes place when the regular or continuous monitoring of the actual conditions of the aircraft 
and its subassembly indicates that the condition of certain components has fallen below a 
certain critical level. 
Aircraft maintenance actions refer to activities that must be performed during aircraft fleet 
maintenance. The main activities are replacements, repairs and checks. A replacement refers 
 to the activity that involves the removal of a failed component from an aircraft or aircraft 
subassembly and the installation of a serviceable spare component in its place. In order that 
replacement can be carried out quickly by maintenance crews, an aircraft usually consists of 
line replaceable units (LRUs). A LRU, which can be quickly replaced in the operational 
location, is a complete functional unit which consists of a number of shop replaceable units 
(SRUs). A SRU represents a part of the function of its parent LRU and is removed, replaced 
and repaired at a back-shop, which is a specified store or workshop where aircraft repair is 
performed. Repair is one of the most important activities in aircraft maintenance, where failed, 
repairable components in the aircraft are restored to a working state.  
Aircraft checks are PM actions where aircraft structural members, systems and components 
are systematically examined, inspected and tested to find potential unserviceable conditions. 
This significantly reduces the risk of operational failures which can cause huge, unpredicted 
losses. Checks are usually performed in different periodic intervals based on usage or 
calendar time. Generally, for civil aircraft there are five types of increasingly intensive checks 
[2]: ‘line/transit’ check, ‘A’ check, ‘B’ check, ‘C’ check and ‘D’ check. Each of the more 
intensive checks contains all of the tasks from lower order checks. In practice, the intervals, 
location, cost of manpower and tasks involved in these checks vary by aircraft type, cycle 
count and the number of hours flown since the previous check. Military aircraft organisations 
normally have their own specific maintenance check programmes that may not be similar to 
those of civil operators. For instance, the U.S. Air Force performs a 5-day phase inspection on 
an individual F-16 aircraft every 400 flying hours [3].  
Aircraft fleet maintenance activities are performed at a number of organisations and 
supported by various resources. Aircraft fleet maintenance resources mainly refer to facilities, 
spare parts and technicians that support the aircraft maintenance operations. Aircraft 
maintenance requires various types of maintenance facilities, ranging from hangars to test 
equipment and tools [4]. An aircraft is an extremely complex system. For instance, there are 
over 4.5 million parts in a Boeing 747. A spare part is defined as a stocked part in an 
inventory that is used to replace or repair a failed part [4]. When maintaining an aircraft, spare 
parts are used to replace components that have failed or need preventive actions in order to 
quickly restore the aircraft to a condition that allows it to meet operational commitments. 
Maintenance crews consist of technicians who are responsible for implementing the required 
maintenance.  
Aircraft maintenance activities are organised and classified according to the location in which 
they take place and the responsibilities of the maintenance crews at these locations. In 
practice, aircraft organisations have their own identification of maintenance levels. Usually 
aircraft fleet maintenance is organised in two or three levels. Three-level maintenance 
includes organisational- (O-level), intermediate- (I-level) and depot-levels (D-level) while 
two-level maintenance only includes the O- and D-levels. When an aircraft fails due to 
component failures, it is usually maintained at the O-level organisation where its failed 
components are removed and replaced by spares. Removed, failed components are sent to the 
I-level maintenance organisation for repair or the depot in case of two-level maintenance. 
Failed components that cannot be repaired at the I-level will be sent to the depot. After repair 
at I-level or D-level, failed components are returned to the fleet. 
In the literature, many models have been established to study aircraft fleet maintenance 
processes. Interest is mainly focused on the modelling of aircraft PM and CM [5-11], 
maintenance organisations [12,13] and maintenance resource management [14-20].  
Dupuy et al. [5] build a discrete event simulation model based on ARENA to study aircraft 
PM. Varelies et al. [6] build a simulation model based on I-think dynamic system software to 
model the life-cycle maintenance of a fleet of aircraft engines. Mattila et al. [7] build a 
discrete simulation model of the three-level maintenance of a fleet of fighter aircraft in the 
Finnish Air Force (FiAF). Sheng and Prescott [8] build a hierarchical CPN model for fleet 
three-level maintenance with cannibalisation, which is a maintenance activity involving the 
removal of working components from NMC aircraft to restore other NMC aircraft when 
 required spares are not available. When studying the workforce-constrained maintenance 
scheduling problem for a military aircraft fleet, Safaei et al. [9] put the emphasis on the 
modelling of pre-flight and post-flight inspections. To optimise the repair of aeronautical 
components, Yang et al. [10] build a CPN model of a detailed aviation component repair 
process. Feng et al. [11] use a heuristic hybrid game approach to model and optimise the 
condition-based PM of aircraft fleet. Shell [12] develops a SLAM II simulation model for 
three-level and two-level maintenance of the Dual Mode Transmitter (DMT, a LRU located in 
the F-16C/D radar) of a fleet of F-16 C/D aircraft. Wang [13] builds a CPN model to compare 
the effectiveness of two-level and three-level aircraft maintenance based on fleet availability 
and maintenance cost. Tang and Zhong [14] build a CPN model of an aircraft-engine 
assembly procedure considering maintenance resource limitations. Alfredsson [15] builds a 
mathematical framework to optimise the amount of spares and test equipment of a fleet 
maintenance system with multi-level repair facilities. Gopalan [16] develops a Rulerian graph 
model to optimise the location of the aircraft fleet maintenance bases. Gallasch et al. [17] 
build a CPN model to evaluate and compare the performance of different staffing and 
scheduling scenarios for maintenance crews in the Australian Army. Sun et al. [18] establisha 
modelling framework for determining the ordering time and quantity of spares for new 
aircraft fleets. Qu et al. [19] build a PN model to study maintenance resource scheduling in a 
military maintenance organisation. Wang et al. [20] build a CPN model of maintenance 
resource management.  
However, existing models of aircraft fleet maintenance only consider a limited number of 
maintenance factors. Non-maintenance factors such as mission-oriented fleet operation, 
aircraft failure logic and component failure characteristics, which significantly affect the fleet 
maintenance performance, are rarely considered. The objective of this paper is to establish a 
comprehensive framework for modelling aircraft fleet performance, which accounts for all 
factors related to aircraft fleet maintenance, operation and reliability. The CPN method is 
selected as the tool to form the framework due to its capability to precisely and concisely 
graphically represent maintenance processes for large fleets, accurately handling concurrency, 
parallelism, conflicts, constraints and dependencies among and between maintenance 
activities and resources, and providing an ideal framework for Monte Carlo simulation. 
2. Analysis of Aircraft Fleet Maintenance Modelling  
To model fleet maintenance, it is necessary to have a good understanding of the related 
modelling parameters. Aircraft fleet maintenance is a complex process and should not simply 
involve responding to aircraft failures and performing scheduled maintenance tasks. There are 
numerous other factors that must be considered, including a variety of maintenance policies 
and activities, different maintenance organisations and the management of maintenance 
resources. A comprehensive aircraft fleet maintenance model should therefore be capable of 
including all of these factors and allowing the impact of maintenance on fleet performance to 
be assessed using appropriate reliability measures.  
Fleet operation and maintenance are highly interrelated. CM tasks in the fleet mainly arrive 
following fleet operation processes. For example, it is generally assumed that an aircraft and 
its components can only fail during operation. During peak utility periods, system and 
component failures are likely to happen more frequently than during off-peak periods, placing 
a strain on the maintenance organisation and hence meaning that maintenance can have a 
significant influence on fleet operational performance. For instance, poor maintenance 
management can lead inoperative aircraft to wait for maintenance for too long a time, 
meaning that the risk of fleet missions being aborted increases due to the reduced availability 
of mission capable aircraft. Therefore fleet operational factors should be included in the 
aircraft fleet maintenance model. Since an aircraft fleet is designed to perform missions, 
mission-oriented fleet operation processes such as mission scheduling, mission assignment 
and mission abort events should also be modelled.  
The aircraft fleet maintenance model must also consider the aircraft and component failure 
dynamics. This is important since different combinations of component failures lead aircraft 
 to fail in different failure modes, each of which requires different maintenance actions and 
policies. For example, if some critical component failures cause an aircraft to be non-mission 
capable, the aircraft will be taken out of service and maintained immediately. If an aircraft 
with component failures can still perform some of its designed missions, its maintenance may 
be deferred to a previously-scheduled maintenance event due to critical operational 
requirements. 
Similarly, aircraft components can have multiple failure modes, which require different 
maintenance activities. It may be possible to repair a failed component at an I-level repair 
shop or it may be necessary to send the component to a depot, depending on its failure mode. 
In addition, a component failure process may have more than one phase, for example 
representing deterioration, leading the modelled component to require multiple component 
states in contrast to the commonly-modelled binary states, where a component is assumed to 
either work or fail. More importantly, an aircraft component usually has more than one 
indenture. An LRU usually consists of a number of SRUs that can be configured with parallel 
elements to offer redundancy, making the aircraft failure logic more complicated than a 
simple series configuration.  
All in all, a complete model of aircraft fleet maintenance should include multiple factors 
related to fleet operation, aircraft failure logic, component indenture, component failure 
characteristics and fleet maintenance that can be divided into four groups: 
 Fleet-level modelling factors: operation-related fleet factors including mission 
scheduling, mission assignment and mission-oriented operation. 
 Aircraft-level modelling factors: including aircraft failure modes, aircraft failure 
logic to describe how component failures cause aircraft failure and aircraft state 
transitions (non-mission capable (NMC) and mission capable (MC)).  
 Component-level modelling factors: component structures (LRU and SRU), 
component failure logic to indicate how lower-indenture failures cause higher 
indenture component failure and component failure characteristics (failure modes, 
binary or multiple states).   
 Maintenance-level modelling factors: consist of fleet maintenance echelons (three-
level or two-level), aircraft maintenance policies (PM or CM, maintenance task 
scheduling policy), maintenance resource management (spare inventory control, 
maintenance crew management, etc.) and details of maintenance activities. 
An aircraft fleet maintenance model that incorporates all of these factors can then be used to 
analyse the impact of an applied maintenance strategy on fleet performance and reliability. 
The model can be used to calculate measures such as: 
 Mission capable rate (assessing fleet reliability by providing the proportion of time 
that platforms are capable of performing missions in a given time interval); 
 Mission abort rate (assessing how often missions must be aborted on the ground or in 
the air due to platform unreliability); 
 Average fleet readiness (assessing the average number of available platforms 
resulting from the applied maintenance strategy); 
 Mean time to repair (assessing the average time taken to restore a NMC aircraft to the 
MC state); 
 Mean time between failures (assessing the average length of time between the failures 
of an aircraft). 
3. Petri Nets  
First introduced by Carl Adam Petri [21], Petri nets (PN) are powerful, graphical and 
mathematical tools for modelling complex, dynamic systems [22]. A PN is a directed graph 
with two types of nodes: places; and transitions, which are connected to one another by 
directed edges or arcs. Places contain a discrete number of tokens and the distribution of 
 tokens within the PN defines its marking, which describes the state of the system modelled at 
any point in time. Transitions govern the dynamic behaviour of the PN; the system state 
changes when transitions fire. In order to fire, a transition must first be enabled, which occurs 
when the number of tokens in each input place is no less than the weight of the arc linking it 
to the transition. Transitions can be immediate, represented by solid bars, or timed, 
represented by hollow bars. Immediate transitions fire as soon as they are enabled and timed 
transitions fire after a delay has elapsed following their becoming enabled.  
A timed transition with three input places and three output places is shown in Figure 1 (the 
place linked by the double-headed arc is both an input and output). The transition is enabled 
since the number of tokens in each input place is at least as high as the weight of the arc 
linking it to the transition. After a delay time t has elapsed a number of tokens equivalent to 
the associated arc weight is removed from each input place and added to each output place. 
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Figure 1. Transition enabling and firing 
 
Figure 2. Inhibitor arc prevents transition firing 
If a transition is linked to an input place by an inhibitor arc, which has a circle at its head, its 
firing process is prohibited when the number of tokens in the place is greater than or equal to 
the weight of the inhibitor arc. Figure 2 shows a transition that is not enabled due to the 
marking of the place linked to it by an inhibitor arc.  
As PN become more complex, the possibility arises for conflicting situations to be 
encountered [23]. For example, the following may occur: 
1. Two or more transitions with different delay times are enabled by the same input 
place; 
2. Two or more transitions with the same delay time (maybe immediate) are enabled by 
the same input place; 
3. An enabled timed transition is disabled while waiting for its delay time to pass. 
These conflicts can arise when modelling aircraft fleet operation and maintenance. For 
example, the first two situations can occur when modelling the scheduling of available 
maintenance resources if resources are simultaneously requested to perform different 
maintenance activities. The third situation arises when modelling the termination of 
component operation processes when an aircraft mission ends.  
 
Figure 3. Two timed transitions enabled by the same place 
In the first situation, the transitions will fire in an order determined by their firing delay times. 
The transition whose delay time elapses soonest fires first and switches a constant number 
(equal to the appropriate arc weight) of tokens from the input place. If, after this, the marking 
of the input place no longer satisfies the enabling conditions of the other transitions, the other 
transitions are no longer enabled and will not fire. Figure 3 shows timed transitions T1 and T2, 
which are enabled due to the marking of P1. If the firing delay times of T1 and T2 are 
respectively t1 and t2 and t1<t2, then T1 will fire first after a time period t1, switching the token 
from P1 to P2, which disables the firing of T2 since P1 is no longer marked. 
In the second situation, if the number of tokens in a place exceeds the sum of all arc weights 
leading from it, all of the enabled transitions will fire simultaneously. If not, the conflict can 
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 be resolved by assigning a level of precedence to the transitions. This can be determined 
randomly or based on some discipline such as the priorities of the actions that are represented 
by the transitions. For instance, the priorities could represent the order in which different 
maintenance actions are performed when there are insufficient maintenance crews or 
equipment available to perform all the required actions. The transition with the highest 
priority fires first and removes the required number of tokens from the place. Subsequent 
transitions fire in order of their priority until the tokens in the input place are exhausted. 
Figure 4 shows the firing process of an example PN with two immediate transitions T1 and T2 
being enabled by the same place, where T1 is assumed to have higher firing priority than T2. 
When P1 is marked, both T1 and T2 are enabled but T1 fires first, immediately removing the 
token from P1; T2 is no longer enabled. The firing order of the two transitions can also be 
determined by a probability check [26]. In Figure 4, T1 fires first with probability p1 when 
both T1 and T2 are enabled. When P1 is marked, a uniform random variable p is sampled in the 
range from 0 to 1. If p ≤ p1, T1 is given a higher firing priority than T2. Otherwise, the firing 
priorities are reversed. This can be used to model the identification of repair shop (I-level or 
depot) for a failed component where p1 represent the probability that the component is 
repairable at I-level.  
The third situation described above can be solved using two main methods: ‘memory’ 
transitions and ‘memory’ tokens [23]. A ‘memory’ transition ‘remembers’ the time it was 
enabled and how much of the delay time remains when its firing process is interrupted and 
resumes its firing process from the same point when it is enabled again. Alternatively, by 
attaching a continuously changing ‘counter’ to each token in an input place, a record of the 
disabled transition can be assigned to ‘memory’ tokens instead [23]. In this case, a token is 
given a counter equal to the transition firing delay, with the counter representing the 
remaining time that a token will be held by the transition’s input place. The token counter 
decreases continuously while it contributes to the enabling of the transition. The decreasing of 
the token counter is interrupted when the transition is disabled. In Figure 6, T1, T2 and T3 have 
constant firing delays t1, t2 (t1<t2) and t3. T1 and T2 are both initially enabled by P1 and P2. T1 
fires after time t1, moving the token from P1 to P3, enabling T3, which will switch the token 
from P3 to P5 after a further time t3. The firing process of T2 is interrupted because of the 
marking of its inhibitor place P3. In this situation, by using the concept of the ‘memory’ token, 
the counter of the token in P2 has decreased to t2-t1 and will remain at this value until P3 is 
unmarked. After T3 fires, T2 is enabled again and its previous firing process will be resumed. 
T2 will then fire after a time t2-t1, which removes the token from P2 and adds it to P4. 
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Figure 4. Conflicting transitions fire with pre-
determined firing priorities 
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Figure 5. Conflicting transitions fire with probabilities 
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Figure 6. Firing process with memory token
The priorities described above make ‘memory’ tokens potentially useful for modelling aircraft 
operation processes. By using a timed transition to represent the failure process of a 
component, the value of the token counter can be used to represent the remaining working life 
 (time to failure) of the component if it can only fail during operation. The token counter 
decreases when the component is operational, a process which stops when the component is 
not operational. The timed transition fires when the counter reaches 0, indicating that its 
remaining life has declined to 0 and that it has failed.  
Created by Jensen and Kristensen [24], coloured Petri nets (CPN) extend PN by allowing the 
behaviour of complex systems, especially those that are concurrent, to be concisely modelled. 
Compared with PN, tokens in CPN are distinguished by token colours. The colour is a label 
that can represent different data types, such as Boolean, integer or character strings. Each 
place has a colour set, which holds the possible token colours of a specified type. Each arc 
has an arc expression, which determines the number of tokens of specific colours that are 
removed from or added to the linked place when a transition fires. Each transition has a guard, 
which is a Boolean expression that represents a constraint on its enabling policy.  
A transition is enabled only if the marking of each input place satisfies the associated input 
arc expression and its guard evaluates to be true. Transitions can fire tokens of different 
colours in different ways and the colour of a token can change after it passes through a 
transition as decided by a specific modelling condition. Figure 7 shows an instance of 
transition enabling and firing for a CPN. 
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Figure 7. Transition enabling and firing of CPN 
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Figure 8. Transition fires tokens with different switching time 
The timed transition in Figure 7 has three input places and one output place, all of which have 
the same colour set CS = {green, red, blue}. cs1, cs2 and cs3 are colour variables that belong to 
CS. The switching of blue and green tokens in the input places is enabled but the red token in 
the input place linked by the inhibitor arc prevents that firing of red tokens. After a delay time 
t has elapsed the transition moves the blue and green tokens from the input places to the 
output place. 
In Figure 7, different coloured tokens have the same delay time in. Generally, tokens with 
different colours will have different delay times, for example modelling the times to failure of 
various components. Figure 8 shows the effects of colours on the firing of transitions. The 
delay times of blue and green tokens are t1 and t2 (t1<t2) respectively. After the delay time t1, 
the blue tokens move to the output place. After a further delay time t2-t1, the transition moves 
the green tokens from the input places to the output places.  
4. CPN Modelling of Aircraft Fleet Maintenance 
As discussed in Section 2, aircraft fleet maintenance processes are affected by four main 
factors that relate to aircraft failure logic, component failure characteristics, detailed 
maintenance activities and maintenance management and fleet operation. A comprehensive 
model, which is able to consider all these factors, predict fleet performance and evaluate fleet 
maintenance strategies will be of great benefit in aiding fleet maintenance decision making.  
Four groups of CPN models are built to represent the processes of fleet operation, aircraft 
failures, component failures and fleet maintenance. These proposed CPN are initially 
designed for military aircraft fleets, which are usually deployed at one or more bases in order 
to perform missions. A typical mission might be a transportation task, a daily training flight, a 
long-distance bombing raid or an air combat task. For instance, when a training flight is called 
 for a fighter aircraft fleet, the fleet manager will check to see if there are enough idle, MC 
aircraft to be assigned to the mission. If not, the training flight is cancelled and a ground abort 
happens.  Otherwise, the required number of MC aircraft take off from the base where they 
are deployed to perform the required training course following the planned flying route. 
Aircraft return to base upon mission completion or if they experience a failure. An aircraft is 
assumed to consist of a number of repairable components which can fail during operation and 
can contribute to the failure of the aircraft. The aircraft failures considered in this paper are 
non-catastrophic, meaning that an aircraft cannot perform a mission required of it due to 
component failures, as opposed to catastrophic, which would lead to loss of the aircraft. 
Maintenance of a failed aircraft is carried out through the replacement of its failed 
components using available resources. Failed components are repaired and then added to the 
fleet spare supply system. Restored aircraft are returned to the fleet to perform missions. MC 
(mission capable) aircraft are periodically inspected in order to avoid unexpected failures. 
The CPN models proposed here are designed to provide a CPN framework that can be used to 
describe the factors affecting aircraft fleet maintenance. Though oriented to military aircraft 
fleets, the modelling framework can also be used to study other fleets of vehicles, such as 
civil aircraft, tanks and helicopters, which have similar maintenance processes to military 
aircraft. The framework is flexible so that it can be modified and extended through the 
inclusion or substitution of new modules if other operational or maintenance actions must be 
considered, without necessarily amending existing modules. 
4.1. CPN Modelling of Fleet Operation 
The mission-oriented fleet operation can be divided into three parts: mission scheduling, 
mission assignment and mission operation, which respectively correspond to determining 
when to perform the required missions, deciding which aircraft should perform scheduled 
missions and the detailed operating processes that assigned aircraft should perform.  
4.1.1. CPN Modelling of Mission Scheduling  
Fleet mission scheduling refers to identifying the start time of each mission. In CPN, prior to 
assignment, different missions can be represented by different coloured tokens held in a 
specified place. Mission scheduling can then be achieved by a timed transition that assigns 
firing delays to tokens in its input place, representing the mission start times. Missions might 
be pre-determined and start at regular, specified times or could depend on factors beyond the 
control of the fleet manager, in which case mission assignment will be more dynamic. 
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Figure 9. CPN of mission scheduling 
Figure 9 shows a CPN model of mission scheduling for an example fleet with two required 
missions that are respectively represented by indices 1 and 2, with labels to describe the 
meanings of its places and transitions. The colour variable M represents an arbitrary mission. 
The transition ‘Mission scheduling’ is enabled and will respectively assign each of token 1 
and 2 with a firing delay. These firing delays might be pre-determined or sampled from a 
known probability distribution, depending on the nature of the mission assignment and how 
this affects their start times. The firing policy of tokens with different firing delays was 
introduced in Section 3. 
4.1.2. CPN Modelling of Mission Assignment 
When a mission is called, the required number of MC aircraft will be assigned to perform it 
by the fleet manager. An assigned aircraft can be FMC (fully mission capable) or PMC 
(partly mission capable) so long as it satisfies the MEL (minimum equipment list) for the 
scheduled mission, which identifies the components that must be operative in order for the 
aircraft to be capable of performing the mission. An aircraft is FMC when it can perform all 
possible designated missions, while it is PMC when it is able to perform at least one of its 
designated missions. A FMC aircraft could have a higher assignment priority than a PMC 
 aircraft. However, this may vary between fleets and will be decided by fleet managers. A 
mission may be cancelled if the number of available aircraft does not satisfy the minimal 
requirement for the mission. This type of mission cancellation is called a ground abort event.  
As shown in Figure 10, the mission assignment event can be represented by an immediate 
transition with an inhibitor arc. An aircraft can be assigned to perform a scheduled mission 
only if it is mission capable and idle, which means it is not performing other missions. 
Therefore, the transition ‘Mission assignment’ is enabled when a mission M is scheduled to 
be performed and there is an idle MC aircraft (represented by A). Once enabled it fires 
immediately, assigning idle MC aircraft to the mission. When the number of tokens in the 
place ‘Assigned aircraft’ is equal to NMM, the number of aircraft required to perform the 
mission, the transition is inhibited since enough aircraft have been assigned to carry out the 
mission.  
When considering FMC and PMC aircraft, information regarding the condition of individual 
aircraft components should be included in the mission assignment model. If FMC aircraft are 
assumed to have higher assignment priorities than PMC aircraft, then this can be modelled 
using transition firing priorities. A modified model of mission assignment that considers FMC 
and PMC aircraft and uses transition firing priority is shown in Figure 11. The assignment 
process is represented by two immediate transitions: ‘Assign FMC aircraft’ and ‘Assign PMC 
aircraft’, with the former having a higher priority than the latter. FMC aircraft are assigned in 
preference to PMC aircraft until the supply of FMC aircraft is exhausted, at which point the 
transition ‘Assign PMC aircraft’ will fire if enabled, a situation that occurs if there are PMC 
aircraft whose operative components meet the MEL of the scheduled mission. 
 
Figure 10. CPN of mission assignment 
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Figure 11. CPN of mission assignment using transition priority 
A fleet mission must usually start within a certain time of it being scheduled. A scheduled 
mission may be cancelled if the assigned MC aircraft cannot reach the mission requirements 
before the assignment time window of the mission closes. If a mission is ground aborted in 
this way, aircraft that have been assigned to the mission will be released and made available 
to perform other missions. Otherwise, the scheduled mission will start once enough aircraft 
are assigned. This process is represented by the CPN module shown in Figure 12. For a 
mission, M, the immediate transition ‘Mission starts’ is enabled and the transition ‘Mission 
ground abort’ is inhibited if NMM aircraft have been assigned to perform the mission, 
represented by tokens in the place ‘Assigned aircraft’. Once enabled, ‘Mission starts’ fires 
immediately, switching the token from the ‘scheduled mission’ to the place ‘Mission start’. 
Otherwise the transition ‘Mission ground abort’ is enabled and will fire after a time delay 
representing the maximum assignment time for M. When ‘Mission ground abort’ fires, the 
token with colour M in the place ‘Scheduled mission’ will be moved to the place ‘Cancelled 
mission’, stating that a mission ground abort event happens. This enables the transition 
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the cancelled mission.  
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Figure 12. CPN of mission ground abort  
4.1.3. CPN Modelling of Mission Operation  
When a mission starts, assigned aircraft take off to perform it and land after operating for a 
number of flying hours determined according to the mission. Note that the required number of 
flying hours for different aircraft in the same mission can vary. The varying requirement for 
different aircraft can be represented by a timed transition, which assigns different firing 
delays to different coloured tokens. As shown in Figure 13, aircraft begin their operations 
when the mission to which they are assigned starts, which is governed by the transition 
‘Aircraft operation starts’. Once a scheduled mission starts, ‘Aircraft operation starts’ fires 
immediately, moving all tokens from the place ‘Assigned aircraft’ to ‘Operating Aircraft’. 
The operating duration for an assigned aircraft, represented by a coloured token in ‘Operating 
aircraft’, is represented by the firing delay that is assigned to the token by the transition 
‘Aircraft operating’. A mission ends when all assigned aircraft land, which can be represented 
by the immediate transition ‘Mission ends’ with an inhibitor arc, shown in Figure 14. For the 
mission M, the transition ‘Mission ends’ is enabled only if there are no remaining assigned, 
operational aircraft. 
If an aircraft becomes NMC while performing a mission, an air abort event happens and the 
aircraft is taken out of service and sent to the maintenance shop for immediate maintenance. 
The aircraft failures considered in this paper refer to non-catastrophic failures, which mean 
that an operating aircraft cannot perform the required mission due to component failures, not 
catastrophic failures which would lead to loss of the aircraft. The non-catastrophic failures are 
represented by an immediate transition ‘Mission air abort’ shown in Figure 15, which is 
enabled when places ‘Operating aircraft’ and ‘NMC Aircraft’ contain tokens of the same 
colour, which represent the same aircraft. Once enabled, ‘Mission air abort’ fires immediately, 
removing the token representing the failed aircraft from ‘Operating aircraft’ and adding it to 
the aircraft maintenance queue.  
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Figure 13. CPN of aircraft operating
Mission
 start
Mission 
finish
Mission 
ends 
𝐴 
𝑀 𝑀 
Operating 
aircraft  
Figure 14. CPN of mission ends 
NMC
Aircraft 
Aircraft 
maintenance 
queue
Mission 
air abort 
𝐴 
𝐴 𝐴 Operating  
aircraft 
 
Figure 15. CPN of mission air abort
  
Figure 16. PN of AND and OR gates [22] 
4.2. CPN Modelling of Aircraft Failure 
The non-catastrophic failure of an aircraft occurs when some of its components fail during 
operation. An aircraft can have numerous failure modes, each of which is caused by a 
different combination of component failures. The causes of aircraft failure modes can be 
represented by fault trees (FTs) and in order to be considered in the CPN modelling 
framework, the FT logic must be converted to a CPN format. Chew [22] introduced a method 
of building an uncoloured PN model for a given FT. In his method, each event is converted to 
a place. As shown in Figure 16, an AND gate is converted to a single immediate transition 
and an OR gate is converted to a number of immediate transitions equivalent to how many 
input events it has. In each case, the input places represent the event inputs to the modelled 
gate. The double-headed arcs are designed to keep a record of the state of input events during 
the PN simulation. The inhibitor arcs prevent an infinite number of immediate transition 
switches from taking place and stop transitions from firing if the event modelled by the output 
place has already occurred and that place is therefore already marked [22].  
Since this conversion of a FT to a PN has no colour, the use of it to model fleets of identical 
aircraft will require an inefficient replication of the entire PN, with one PN being required for 
each failure mode for each aircraft. 
However, by employing colours, arc expressions and transition guards, identical failure 
modes from any number of identical aircraft can be modelled using a single CPN. In a CPN 
all basic events are represented by the single place ‘Component failure’ with each basic event 
represented by a different coloured token. All non-basic events are represented by a place 
each. Thus the CPN model of an AND gate is an immediate transition whose basic event 
inputs are represented by a single place. Figures 18 and 19 respectively show the converted 
CPN for the AND gates G5 and G2 of the example FT shown in Figure 17. The AND gate G5 
is represented by the immediate transition ‘G5’ while basic events C9 and C10 are represented 
by the place ‘Component failure’ and the place ‘S4’ describes the intermediate event S4. The 
transition is enabled when components C9 and C10 of the same aircraft fail during a mission. 
Once enabled it fires immediately, creating a token whose colour represents the intermediate 
event S4 of the aircraft in the output place. The CPN for the AND gate G2 is similar, with its 
basic event inputs represented by a single place and its intermediate event input, S3, being 
represented as an input to the transition by the place created to model it.  
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Figure 17. Example aircraft fault tree 
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Figure 18. CPN of AND gate G5 
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Figure 19. CPN of AND gate G2
(a) (b)
 For an OR gate, the corresponding CPN consists of a number of immediate transitions whose 
input places represent the OR gate’s event inputs. Figure 20 shows the converted CPN for the 
OR gate G1. The gate is converted to three immediate transitions G1(1) - G1(3), for which the 
output place represents an aircraft failure event (since the output of G1 is the top event). The 
transition G1(1) is enabled when either of components C1 or C2 fail. G1(2) and G1(3) are 
enabled when the intermediate events S1 and S2 occur respectively. As soon as one of the 
three transitions has fired, and a token representing the failed aircraft has been placed in 
‘Aircraft failure’, then all three transitions are disabled to ensure that only one token 
representing the failed aircraft can appear in ‘Aircraft failure’. Using these rules for 
converting FT to CPN, a CPN for the example FT shown in Figure 17 can be constructed; the 
result is shown in Figure 21.  
Figure 22 models the aircraft state transitions. The state of an aircraft changes from MC to 
NMC when some of its critical components fail and vice versa following restoration. These 
processes are respectively represented by transitions ‘Aircraft failed’ and ‘Aircraft 
maintained’. 
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Figure 20. CPN of an example OR gate 
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Figure 21. CPN of the example FT 
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Figure 22. CPN of aircraft state change 
4.3. CPN Modelling of Component Failure 
Modelling aircraft component failures forms the basis of aircraft fleet maintenance modelling. 
Component failures not only induce aircraft failure events but also lead to the requirement for 
specific component maintenance tasks. Components could be considered to have binary states, 
in which case they could either work or fail, or to have multiple states, which could be used to 
model component degradation of the type that might be observed in a condition monitoring 
process as part of a preventive maintenance scheme. Component indentures must also be 
considered since aircraft, in common with other complex and expensive platforms such as 
ships, usually consist of multi-indentured components. Redundant components are often 
employed in aircraft in an attempt to increase reliability. The above situations can introduce 
dependencies, e.g. component failure dependencies that arise due to components experiencing 
an increased load due to the failure of other components or due to active and standby 
redundancies, where the failure rates of components change according to whether they are in 
 operation or on standby for other components. Component repair dependencies can also arise 
due to component indenture. Whilst these dependencies could not be modelled using a 
technique such as Fault Tree Analysis, CPN models can be developed to analyse each of these 
situations, as shown in the following subsections. 
4.3.1 Binary State Components  
In binary-state theory, a component is assumed to have two states: 0 (working) and 1 (failed). 
To model such a component, Chew [22] build an uncoloured PN model with a timed 
transition as shown in Figure 23. Places ‘0’ and ‘1’ respectively represent the working and 
failed states of an individual component. Every binary-state aircraft component will have its 
own PN model in which one uncoloured token is placed in either place ‘0’ or ‘1’. The 
transition is enabled when place ‘0’ is marked. Once enabled a time delay will be sampled 
from a known probability distribution, which is defined according to the failure characteristics 
of the modelled component.  
It is possible to represent all binary-state components on an aircraft using a single CPN, as 
shown in Figure 24. The place ‘Component working’ represents all working binary-state 
components of all aircraft in the fleet studied. For a component C, it can fail only when the 
aircraft A to which it is fitted is performing a mission. The transition ‘component fails’ is 
enabled if places ‘Component working’ and ‘Operating aircraft’ respectively contain coloured 
tokens C and A that satisfy the transition guard ‘C belongs to A’.  
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Figure 23. PN model of binary-state component failure [22] 
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Figure 24. CPN model of binary-state component failure 
If the component C fails before the aircraft A finishes performing the current mission 
(‘Operating aircraft’ is still marked with token A when the sampled firing delay of token C 
runs out), the transition will switch the token C from ‘Component working’ to ‘Component 
failure’, indicating that component C fails. It is assumed that component C only fails during 
operation meaning that it cannot fail once the mission has ended either because of component 
failures leading to the aircraft becoming NMC or because the current mission is complete. 
This means that the failure process can be interrupted. To resume the interrupted failure 
process when the aircraft is operating again, the component condition (remaining working life) 
at the break point must be memorised. The ‘memory’ token, introduced in Section 3, is 
employed to achieve this action in this paper. The component remaining life is represented by 
a child variable of the component colour C. The variable is initialised by sampling from a 
known probability distribution and decreases when the transition ‘Component fails’ is enabled 
by the related component. The component failure process is interrupted when the related 
firing process is disabled. When resuming a component failure process, the transition will 
assign a new firing delay to the component that is equal to its remaining working life.  
An aircraft component can fail in different modes due, for example, to fatigue, corrosion or 
overload. Different component failure modes can induce different aircraft failure modes and 
require different maintenance actions. For example, a fuel system valve may fail closed 
leading to an interruption of the fuel supply and a subsequent loss of power, or fail open, 
meaning the fuel supply cannot be cut and engine thrust not reduced. Figure 25 shows the 
CPN model for a component C with NCFM failure modes represented by 1,…,NCFM. The 
conflicting transitions representing failure in each mode are enabled at the same time and will 
each assign a firing delay to the working component C that represents the expected time to 
fail in a particular mode. As introduced in Section 3, the transition with the smallest firing 
 delay fires first, removing token C from ‘Component working’ and adding a token to 
‘Component failure,’ identifying the failed component and its related failure mode. 
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Figure 25. CPN of multiple component failure modes 
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Figure 26. CPN of dependent component failures
The CPN models shown in Figures 24 and 25 are built based on the assumption that 
component failures are independent. However, dependency may exist between the failure 
processes of different components. The failure of a component may accelerate or even 
directly result in the failure of other components. For instance, a computer processor will 
overheat and fail much sooner if the fan fails. With the assumption that the failure of 
component C1 is accelerated if component C2 fails, Figure 26 shows the CPN model for 
dependent components. The transition ‘Component fails’ is almost the same as that in Figure 
24 except for the extra inhibitor arc. If component C2 of aircraft A fails first during operation, 
the normal firing process of component C1 of aircraft A by the transition ‘Component fails’ is 
interrupted by the inhibitor arc. Instead, the transition ‘Component failure influenced by 
dependency’ is enabled and a new time delay is assigned to the firing of the token with colour 
C1. The time delay is sampled based on the expected remaining life of the component C1 and 
the new probability distribution of the altered failure process. The sampling policy transfers 
the expected remaining life of the component to an equivalent expected remaining life in the 
new failure probability distribution [23]. If the remaining life (in working hours) of 
component C1 is ca when component C2 fails and F1 and F2 are CDFs of the ordinary and 
accelerated failure probabilities respectively, the equivalent remaining life ca1 can be 
represented by: 
ca1=F2-1[F1 (ca)]                                                        (1) 
4.3.2. Multiple State Components  
Sometimes binary state theory oversimplifies real situations where the conditions of 
components can be classified into a range of levels from perfect function to complete failure. 
For instance, as introduced by Gurler and Kaya [25], railroad tracks, telecommunication 
systems and infrastructure systems fail with multiple states. Multi-state theory should be 
applied to modelling aircraft component failures because of PM actions, especially related to 
condition-based maintenance.  
When modelling multiple-state components, the first step is to identify all the possible 
component states. A mathematical description of multi-state component theory is a state array 
or a set with finite variables such as (0,…,N) where 0 and N respectively signify the perfect 
working state and the complete failure state. When the states are identified, the CPN model 
can be built by assigning each state its own place and using a timed transition to represent the 
change from one state to the next. 
As an example, Figure 27 shows the CPN model for a component C with 3 states: working, 
PM due and failed. The transition ‘Component needs PM’ represents the degradation of the 
working component to the condition where preventive replacement is necessary. The process 
from PM due to failed is described by the transition ‘PM component fails’. The enabling and 
firing polices of the two transitions are similar to those of the transition ‘Component fails’ in 
Figure 24.  
  
 
 
𝐶 
𝐴 
𝐶 
𝐴 
𝐶 𝐶 Component  
working
Component  
failure
Component  
PM due
𝐶 belongs to  𝐴 𝐶 belongs to  𝐴 
Component 
needs PM
PM Component 
fails
Operating  
aircraft 
 
Figure 27. CPN of multi-state components under a 
condition-based PM policy 
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Figure 28. CPN of multi-state components under a 
time-based PM policy
While under time-based PM, components are preventively replaced at pre-determined 
intervals. There is a probability that a component fails before its usage reaches the PM 
threshold. This means that the state of the component may directly change from working to 
failed. The CPN model shown in Figure 27 is not suitable for such components. The modified 
model which considers time-based PM is shown in Figure 28. When a component C in an 
operational aircraft A enables the transition ‘Component fails,’ the remaining life of the 
component in the working state decreases. The timed transition ‘Component needs TPM’ with 
fixed firing delay represents the transition from the working state to the PM due state. The 
fixed firing delay of ‘Component needs TPM’ represents the PM threshold (in cumulative 
working hours) of the component C. If the fixed firing delay runs out before the remaining 
life of the component declines to 0, transition ‘Component needs TPM’ fires, moving the 
token C to the place ‘Component PM due’. This enables the transition ‘PM component fails’, 
which models the remaining component working life, given its usage when PM was identified 
as being due. 
4.3.3. Component Indenture  
Line replaceable units, LRUs, allow the rapid replacement of multiple components. A LRU 
can be viewed as a multiple indentured component that is made up of shop-replaceable units, 
SRUs, configured as necessary to provide the required levels of functional redundancy. A 
SRU can be replaced at a repair shop when it causes the LRU to fail. A SRU may also be 
multiple indentured and consist of a number of lower-indenture components.  
The failure of a higher-indenture component can be viewed as an immediate event that is 
induced by the failure of its lower-indenture components. The failure processes of lowest-
level components can be modelled by a timed transition as shown in Figure 24. The failure 
process of higher-level components can be represented by immediate transitions that take 
inputs from places which describe the failures of their child components.  
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Figure 29. CPN of two-indenture component 
Figure 29 shows the CPN model for an example two-indenture LRU whose child SRUs are 
connected in series. The timed transition ‘SRU fails’ and immediate transition ‘LRU fails’ 
represent the failure processes of the SRUs and LRU respectively. Colour variables LC and 
SC respectively represent a LRU and a SRU. The enabling policy of the transition ‘SRU fails’ 
is similar to that of the transition ‘Component fails’ in Figure 24 except for the requirement 
that a SRU is able to work only if the LRU to which it is fitted is working. This requirement 
 represents the fact that a LRU may be a functional unit with elements of the overall function 
provided by each SRU. When a SRU SC fails, transition ‘LRU fails’ is enabled and fires 
immediately, moving the token with colour LC, representing the parent LRU of SC, from 
‘LRU working’ to ‘LRU failure’. This models the failure of LRU LC on aircraft A.  
4.3.4. Component Redundancy 
Component redundancy is usually introduced to expensive, safety-critical platforms such as 
aircraft in order to improve platform reliability and availability and to reduce the number of 
unexpected failures. When an online, functioning component fails during operation, a 
redundant component will be brought into operation to act in its place and ensure the system 
can continue to operate. Redundant components can be active or standby. Active-redundancy 
components simultaneously start to operate alongside their related functioning components. 
Standby-redundancy components can be cold, warm or hot. Cold standby components do not 
operate and suffer failures until they are brought into operation. Warm standby components 
work continuously during aircraft operation but fail with a lower probability when on standby 
than when operational, while hot-standby components provide active redundancies [22]. In 
the standby case, redundant components are sequentially switched into operation when active, 
functioning components fail. The switching may be performed either automatically, where 
sensors continuously monitor online components and activate redundancies accordingly, or 
manually, where an operator is responsible for bringing redundant components online [22]. 
Analysis of redundancies should also include switching failures since these will prevent 
redundant components from becoming operational when required. Automatic switching may 
happen anytime due to sensor failures, while manual errors are likely to occur with some 
probability during switching [22]. Component dependencies arise due to: the operational 
states (active or standby) of redundant components being determined by the state (working or 
failed) of the related online components; whether switching is successful after component 
failure; and the acceleration of cold- and warm-standby component failures when they are 
switched online. 
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Figure 30. CPN of component redundancy with manual 
switching 
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Figure 31. CPN of component redundancy with sensor 
failures
Since active redundant components function alongside primary components, no switching 
process is required. The failure of an active redundant component can hence be modelled by 
the CPN model shown in Figure 24. For standby redundancy, Figure 30 represents an 
example CPN model considering a manual switching error. For a component C, the 
probability of human error during switching is assumed to be pC. When an online component 
C fails (the transition ‘Component fails’ fires), a redundancy switch request will be called as a 
token is added to the place ‘Redundancy switch request’. This enables the transitions ‘Switch 
successful’ and ‘Switch fails’. A random number, r (0≤ r ≤1), is sampled from a uniform 
 distribution. If r > pC, the transition ‘Switch successful’ will fire and move the token C(1), the 
redundant component of the failed component C, from ‘Redundant components working’ to 
‘Online component working’. Otherwise, the transition ‘Switch fails’ will fire and a manual 
redundancy switch failure happens. If the redundant component C(1) is not cold standby, the 
standby component could fail before the online component fails. This process is represented 
by the transition ‘Redundant component fails’ which samples a failure time for a warm or hot 
standby component. 
Since a component is less likely to fail when on warm standby than when operational, its 
failure process will be altered when brought into operation. This is governed by the transition 
‘Component fails’, which samples a firing delay and assigns it to the related token in the place 
‘Online component working’, representing the equivalent expected online remaining life of 
the switched component, based on the operational failure probability distribution and the time 
it has spent on standby. The detailed sampling policy of the transition ‘component fails’ is 
similar to that of the transition ‘Component failure influenced by dependency’ in Figure 26 
which was introduced in Section 4.3.1. As a component on hot standby experiences the same 
failure processes as its online component, the transition ‘component fails’ assigns a firing 
delay equivalent to its remaining life on hot standby when the component is switched into 
operation. 
Figure 31 shows a CPN model of redundancy with automatic switching. The place ‘Sensor 
working’ represents the sensors that monitor the failure of online components being in a 
working state. As opposed to manual switching, when the standby component C(1) for online 
component C must be switched when C fails, the transition ‘Switch successful’ can be 
enabled only if the sensor S is working (place ‘Sensor working’ contains a token with colour 
S) since it must detect the change in condition of C. The failure processes of the sensors are 
represented by the transition ‘Sensor fails’. As introduced in the case of manual switch, when 
the switch of a warm-standby component happens, a firing delay which represents the 
expected online remaining life will be assigned to the related component by the transition 
‘Component fails’.  
4.4. CPN Modelling of Fleet Maintenance 
Aircraft fleet maintenance can be performed at three levels: O-level, I-level (optional) and D-
level, using corrective and scheduled maintenance actions. The O-level maintenance 
organisation is mainly responsible for the restoration of inoperative aircraft to the working 
state through the replacement of failed components, or those requiring preventive replacement, 
using spares. After removal, consumable components are discarded and repairable 
components are sent to the I-level maintenance organisation for repair. If a component is 
declared to be non-repairable at the I-level maintenance organisation, it is then sent to the 
depot for repair. Repaired components are used to replenish the spare supply chain.  
4.4.1. O-level Maintenance Model  
The major maintenance tasks of the O-level maintenance organisation are the corrective and 
preventive maintenance of NMC aircraft. When an aircraft fails, it is immediately taken out of 
service and added to the aircraft maintenance queue which holds all the NMC aircraft that 
must be restored. Maintenance crews first remove the failed components from the aircraft and 
then fill the ‘holes’ with spare components. To prevent mission air abort events, aircraft are 
periodically inspected and any components that need to be are replaced under a preventive 
maintenance strategy. Therefore, the major O-level maintenance activity is component 
replacement.  
Failed components of a NMC aircraft can be replaced only if the aircraft has been placed into 
the aircraft maintenance queue. Figure 32 shows a CPN which identifies the component 
replacement tasks for the O-level maintenance organisation. The transition ‘Set component 
replacement queue’ is enabled and fires immediately when a token with colour A is added to 
the place ‘Aircraft maintenance queue’, moving tokens representing the failed components of 
aircraft A from the place ‘Component failure’ to the place ‘Component replacement queue’.  
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Figure 32. CPN of set component replacement queue
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Figure 33. CPN of component removal 
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Figure 34. CPN of component installation
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Figure 35. CPN of transport from O-level to I-level 
In CPN, a maintenance activity can be modelled as a timed transition whose firing delays 
represent the time taken to complete the activity. A component replacement action consists of 
two sequential activities: removal and installation. Figure 33 shows the CPN model for 
component removal. The transition ‘Remove’ represents the process of removing failed 
components. For a token in ‘Component replacement queue’, the firing delay assigned to this 
token represents the time taken to remove the failed component represented by the token. The 
CPN model for the installation of spare components is shown in Figure 34. When a failed 
component has been removed and a spare is ready, the transition is enabled and will fire after 
a period of time representing the installation time. The removal/installation time could be 
modelled as being constant or sampled from a known distribution, determined from an 
analysis of the actual maintenance processes. After removal, failed components will be 
transported to the I-level maintenance queue for repair. This process is represented by the 
CPN model in Figure 35. The firing delay associated to the transition ‘Transport from O-level 
to I-level’ represents the actual time taken to transport failed components from the O-level 
maintenance organisation to the I-level maintenance organisation. 
Aircraft check intervals are usually usage-based. A usage-based aircraft check can be 
modelled as an immediate transition that is driven by aircraft flight hours. A time-varying 
parameter is added to the aircraft colour A that represents the number of hours that the aircraft 
needs to fly before its next check; this allows the CPN model for an aircraft ‘A’ check shown 
in Figure 36 to be built. The initial value of the parameter is equal to the aircraft ‘A’ check 
interval (represented by TAC). The parameter decreases during aircraft operation (the transition 
‘Aircraft operating’ in Figure 13 is enabled by the aircraft). When this parameter reaches 0 for 
a MC, idle aircraft A (both places ‘MC aircraft’ and ‘Idle aircraft’ have a token with colour A), 
the transition ‘Aircraft check’ is enabled and fires immediately, when a token with colour A 
will be switched from ‘MC aircraft’ to ‘Aircraft maintenance queue’, with the decreasing 
parameter reset to TAC, meaning that a new check cycle will start for the aircraft. This enables 
the transition ‘Set PM component replacement queue’, which immediately places any 
components with the PM due state on the aircraft undergoing the check into the component 
replacement queue. 
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Figure 37. CPN of aircraft restored
 Similarly, other aircraft fleet checks (‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’) can be modelled through adding new 
parameters to the aircraft colour A. The value of a new parameter is initially the interval of the 
related aircraft check and will continuously decrease as the related aircraft is performing 
missions. Note that each of the more intensive checks usually contains all of the tasks from 
lower order checks. When any parameter of a MC, idle aircraft decreases to 0, the transition 
‘Aircraft check’ fires immediately, sending the aircraft for the related check and resetting the 
parameter and those relating to the lower order checks of the aircraft to the corresponding 
check intervals. 
A NMC aircraft that is undergoing maintenance is restored when all its components are 
working. The CPN model in Figure 37 identifies the restored aircraft. Assume an aircraft 
consists of N components, labelled C1, C2,…, CN. The transition ‘Identify restored aircraft’ is 
enabled when there are N different components in the place ‘Component working’ which 
belong to the same aircraft. Once enabled, ‘Identify restored aircraft’ fires immediately, 
moving the token representing the restored aircraft from ‘Aircraft maintenance queue’ to 
‘Aircraft restored’.  
4.4.2. I-level Maintenance Model  
A removed component is first sent to the I-level maintenance organisation to check whether it 
can be repaired there or not. If not, the component will be classified as NRTS (not repairable 
this station) and sent to the depot. Otherwise I-level maintenance crews carry out the 
necessary repairs to restore it to the working condition. In the developed CPN model it has 
been assumed that a component is repairable at the I-level repair shop with a certain 
probability, which depends on the component type. If pC represents the probability that 
component C is repairable at I-level, a CPN such as that given in Figure 38 models repair 
shop allocation. The two transitions are enabled when a failed component C arrives at the I-
level maintenance shop. A number, r, is randomly sampled from a uniform distribution. If r ≤ 
pC, the transition ‘Component repairable at I-level’ fires and moves the token C from ‘I-level 
repair queue’ to ‘Component I-level repairable’. Otherwise, the transition ‘Component NRTS 
at I-level’ fires and the failed component is stated non-repairable at I-level and sent to the 
depot by the transition ‘Transport from I-level to D-level’ in Figure 39. If the modelled fleet 
employs two-level maintenance, pC is set to zero for all component types, effectively 
excluding the I-level maintenance model.  
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Figure 38. CPN of component repair shop allocation 
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Figure 39. CPN of transport from I-level to D-level 
Figure 40 shows the CPN model of I-level component repair. The influence of repair is 
reflected in the modelled expected working life of repaired components. Under perfect repair 
(‘as good as new’), the expected working life of a repaired component C is newly sampled 
from the known probability distribution relating to the component failure time. Using an 
additional variable to memorise the age (in cumulative working hours) of the component 
since its last repair, under minimal repair (‘as bad as old’) the new component working life is 
obtained by sampled from the distribution based on the component age, while under imperfect 
repair the new component working life is sampled according to a younger age between 0 and 
the age immediately prior to repair. The representation of the repair impact is achieved by the 
timed transition ‘I-level repair’ which changes the time-varying parameters of tokens in the 
 ‘Component I-level repairable’ when they are passed to it by ‘I-level repaired component’. 
The firing delay assigned to a token C by transition ‘I-level repair’ represents the actual time 
taken to repair component C in the I-level maintenance organisation. After repair at the I-level 
maintenance organisation, components will be sent back to the O-level maintenance 
organisation, which form the new spare inventory. This process is represented by the CPN 
model in Figure 41. 
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Figure 40. CPN model of I-level component repair 
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4.4.3. D-level Maintenance Model  
It is assumed that failed, repairable components can always be repaired at the depot. The D-
level maintenance model describes the repairs of failed components in the depot, which are 
similar to those in the I-level repair shop. The repair time of similar components may be 
different at I-level and D-level repair shops due to possible discrepancies in repair capabilities 
for reasons such as number and type of repair tools and maintenance crew skills. The CPN 
model for depot repair is shown in Figure 42. After repair at the depot, the transition 
‘Transport from D-level to O-level’ in Figure 43 is responsible for sending new spares back to 
the O-level maintenance organisation from the depot.   
𝐶 𝐶 
D-level 
repaired 
component
D-level 
repair 
D-level 
repair
 queue 
 
Figure 42. CPN of D-level component repair 
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4.4.4. Manpower Limitations  
Since there is a finite number of maintenance crews, there is a probability that a maintenance 
task will have to be delayed because maintenance crews are occupied. Figure 44 shows how 
to modify the CPN model for the removal of failed components when there is a limited 
number of maintenance crews. nC represents the number of maintenance crews required to 
remove component C. The place ‘O-level maintenance crews’ represents the number of idle 
maintenance crews in the O-level maintenance organisation. When a failed component C 
must be removed, the removal work can only begin if there are nC idle O-level maintenance 
crews. If so, the transition ‘Removal starts’ fires immediately and O-level crews start to 
remove the component. After the component is removed (transition ‘Remove’ fires), the 
previously occupied nC crews are idle again and can be assigned to perform other 
maintenance tasks. A similar modified component installation model accounting for 
manpower limitations is shown in Figure 45.  
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Figure 44. CPN of component removal with manpower 
limitation 
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Figure 45. CPN of component installation with 
manpower limitation
Further, there could be a conflict when multiple maintenance actions are called at the same 
time but there are not enough idle crews to perform them all. In such a situation, it is 
necessary to properly allocate and schedule the maintenance crews according to maintenance 
objectives. This can be achieved by prioritising the maintenance tasks. This is achieved in the 
CPN model using the priority transitions introduced in Section 3. For example, the scheduling 
of component removal and installation can be achieved by setting the firing priorities of 
transitions ‘Removal starts’ and ‘Installation starts’. 
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Figure 46. CPN of I-level component repair with 
manpower limitation 
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Figure 47. CPN of D-level component repair with 
manpower limitation
These conflicts do not only arise for different maintenance activities but also in different tasks 
relating to the same maintenance action, such as the repairs of different types of components. 
The repairs of failed components for which there are no spares in stock may need to be 
performed first if a NMC aircraft is waiting for that spare. This can be solved by assigning 
different priorities to different coloured tokens in the input place representing the queue of 
components to be repaired. Figure 46 shows the I-level component repair CPN model that is 
modified to allow maintenance crew constraints to be considered. If two components C1 and 
C2 are placed into the I-level repair queue but there is only one idle crew (represented by mc), 
the maintenance manager should decide which one to repair first. If the repair of C1 is more 
urgent, the transition ‘I-level repair starts’ will first fire and move the token C1 from the place 
‘Component I-level repairable’ to the place ‘Component under I-level repair’, removing the 
token mc from ‘I-level maintenance crews’. The repair of C2 must wait until an idle 
maintenance crew is available. Similarly, the modified D-level component repair module 
which accounts for manpower limitations is shown in Figure 47. 
5. CPN Model Framework 
The CPN model of aircraft fleet maintenance is made up of four modules (explained in detail 
in Sections 4.1 to 4.4 respectively): 
 Fleet module – models mission-oriented aircraft fleet operation; 
 Aircraft module – models aircraft failures and changes of aircraft state; 
 Component module – models component failures; 
 Maintenance module – models the three-level aircraft fleet maintenance processes. 
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Figure 48. Connections between CPN modules 
Figure 48 shows the connections between the four modules. The fleet module is responsible 
for scheduling, assigning and performing the missions required of aircraft in the fleet. When a 
mission is called, the fleet module assigns MC aircraft (represented by tokens in the place 
‘MC aircraft’) to perform it, placing tokens representing the selected MC aircraft into the 
place ‘Operating aircraft’. This activates the component module, which outputs component 
failures to the aircraft module through the place ‘Component failure’. If component failures 
cause an aircraft to become NMC, the aircraft module, in turn, places the aircraft failure event 
into the fleet module through the place ‘NMC aircraft’. The fleet module then takes the NMC 
aircraft out of service and sends it to the aircraft maintenance queue immediately. The 
maintenance module governs the restoration of NMC aircraft by replacing their failed 
components by spares. After all failed components are replaced, restored aircraft and their 
working components are respectively output to the aircraft module and the component 
module through places ‘Aircraft restored’ and ‘component working’ by the maintenance 
 module. The aircraft module changes the state of the restored aircraft from NMC to MC, 
signifying that they are available to be assigned to perform missions by the fleet module again. 
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Figure 49. Fleet module structure 
The structure of the fleet module is shown in Figure 49. The fleet module consists of five sub-
modules: mission scheduling, mission assignment, mission ground abort, mission operation 
and mission air abort. When a mission is scheduled, the mission scheduling sub-module 
outputs the mission to the mission assignment sub-module, which assigns MC, idle aircraft 
(tokens with same colour in places ‘MC aircraft’ and ‘Idle aircraft’ ) to perform the mission. 
If the required number of aircraft (represented by tokens in the place ‘Assigned aircraft’) have 
been assigned to the mission before its assignment time window closes, the scheduled mission 
starts and a token is added to the place ‘Mission start’ by the mission ground abort sub-
module. Otherwise, the scheduled mission is cancelled and the mission ground abort sub-
module returns the pre-assigned aircraft to the mission assignment sub-module, stating that 
they can be assigned to other missions. The mission operation sub-module governs the 
operation of the assigned aircraft, adding the operating aircraft to the place ‘Operating aircraft’ 
and returning them to the place ‘Idle aircraft’ after the mission ends. If an operating aircraft 
becomes NMC during operation, the mission air abort sub-module will add it to the aircraft 
maintenance queue.  
Figure 50 shows the aircraft module, which has two sub-modules: aircraft failure and aircraft 
state change. When an aircraft fails due to component failures, the aircraft sub-module 
outputs the aircraft failure to the aircraft state change sub-module, where the state of the 
failed aircraft is changed from MC to NMC (the related token is removed from the place ‘MC 
aircraft’ to the place ‘NMC aircraft’). After restoration, the aircraft state change sub-module 
will reset the state of the NMC aircraft to MC again.  
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Figure 50. Aircraft module structure 
The component module is responsible for modelling the component failure events which 
happen on operating aircraft. A number of component modules that differ according to the 
component state, failure dependency, indenture and redundancy have been introduced in 
Section 4.3. Fleet managers can select the appropriate module based on their own component 
structure.  
The maintenance module, having three sub-modules, is shown in Figure 51. NMC aircraft in 
the aircraft maintenance queue (tokens in ‘Aircraft maintenance queue’) are maintained in the 
O-level maintenance sub-module, where their failed components (tokens in ‘Component 
failure’) are replaced by spares (tokens in ‘Spare component’). When the restoration of an 
aircraft is finished, the O-level maintenance sub-module will remove the aircraft from the 
place ‘Aircraft maintenance queue’ and add it to the place ‘Aircraft restored’, showing its 
replaced components in the place ‘Component working’. Removed, failed components at O-
 level are first added to the I-level repair queue so that repair can be attempted in the I-level 
maintenance sub-module. If they are found to be repairable at I-level, maintenance crews will 
repair them and send them back to I-level through the place ‘spare component’. Otherwise, 
they will be sent to the depot to be repaired in the D-level maintenance sub-module, which 
will return them to the O-level maintenance sub-module as spares after repair. The details of 
the O-level maintenance, I-level maintenance and D-level maintenance sub-modules are 
shown in Figures 52-54 respectively.  
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Figure 51. Maintenance module structure 
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Figure 52. O-level maintenance sub-module structure 
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Figure 53. I-level maintenance sub-module structure 
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Figure 54. D-level maintenance sub-module structure 
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Figure 55. CPN model framework 
 The overall CPN framework is shown in Figure 55. When applying the CPN model to a 
specific fleet, first model users need to define the token colours, place colour sets, arc 
expressions and transition guards for each module. Secondly, fleet parameters such as the 
number of aircraft within the fleet, the number of components within an aircraft, spare 
inventory, component removal/installation time and component repair time at I-level and D-
level must be input to the CPN model by setting the related place markings and firing delays. 
Tables 1 and 2 respectively list places and transitions that must be initialised and the 
associated input parameters. In addition, the required number of MC aircraft to perform a 
scheduled mission and the I-level repair probability of failed components are respectively 
governed by the arc expressions of the inhibitor arc linking the place ‘Assigned aircraft’ to the 
transition ‘Mission assignment’ in the mission assignment sub-module and the input arc from 
the place ‘I-level repair queue’ to the transition ‘Component repairable at I-level’ in the 
component repair shop allocation sub-module.  
Table 1. Input parameters represented by place marking 
Place Module Input parameter 
Fleet missions 
Mission 
scheduling 
The total number of required missions  
MC aircraft  
Aircraft state 
change  
The total number and indices of platforms in the fleet 
Component working Component  The total number and indices of components in platforms  
Spare component 
Component 
installation  
The number of spares for each type of component  
O-level maintenance  
crews  
O-level 
maintenance  
The number of maintenance crews at the O-level 
maintenance organisation  
I-level maintenance  
crews  
I-level 
maintenance 
The number of maintenance crews at the I-level 
maintenance organisation  
D-level maintenance  
crews 
D-level 
maintenance 
The number of maintenance crews at the D-level 
maintenance organisation  
Table 2. Input parameters represented by transition firing delays 
Transition Module Input parameter  
Mission scheduling  Mission scheduling  The start time of each mission  
Mission ground 
abort 
Mission ground abort The assignment time window of each mission  
Aircraft operating Mission operation The length of each mission  
Component fails Component failure Component failure time  
Remove Component removal Removal time of failed components  
Install Component installation  Installation time of spare components 
I-level repair  I-level component repair Component repair time at I-level  
D-level repair  D-level component repair Component repair time at D-level  
Transport from O-
level to I-level 
Transport from O-level to 
I-level  
The transportation time from O-level to I-level  
Transport from I-
level to D-level 
Transport from I-level to 
D-level  
The transportation time from I-level to O-level  
Transport from I-
level to O-level 
Transport from I-level to 
O-level  
The transportation time from I-level to O-level  
Transport from D-
level to O-level 
Transport from D-level to 
O-level  
The transportation time from D-level to O-level  
6. Model Analysis 
Due to the stochastic nature of aircraft fleet operation and maintenance processes, calculating 
fleet performance through analytical solution of the CPN model is impossible. After the 
characteristics of all places, transitions and arcs of the CPN model have been identified for 
the modelled fleet, the initialised model can be used as a framework for a Monte Carlo 
simulation analysis of the modelled fleet.  
Monte Carlo simulation uses repeated random sampling and statistical analysis to obtain the 
required system performance [29]. Performing a Monte Carlo simulation for an aircraft fleet 
needs a computer model of the fleet operation, which must have a set of rules to govern the 
responses to all possible events relating to the fleet operation and maintenance processes such 
as component failures, repairs, removals and installations. The construction of a computer 
 model relies on a logical representation of the operation of the studied fleet, identifying all the 
events that can occur, all the activities that can be performed and the correspondence between 
the events and activities [27]. In this case, the presented CPN model of aircraft fleet 
maintenance provides a graphical description of the fleet operation. This can then form a 
framework for the establishment of the computer model. 
In order to obtain the required fleet performance measures, the computer model then 
simulates the occurrence of fleet events and corresponding activities for a suitable period of 
time, for example the system lifetime or the length of a few missions [27]. During the 
simulations, the times relating to events and activities such as the component failure and 
repair times can be obtained by randomly sampling from the associated probability 
distributions that describe the behavior of the real system. For example, if the time to failure 
of a component, t, follows a Weibull distribution with scale parameter η and shape parameter 
β for which the cumulative distribution function (CDF), F(t), is: 
F (t) = 1 - exp [-(
t
η
)β]                                                           (2) 
then using a random number x sampled from the U[0,1] distribution, the component failure 
time can be calculated using the expression: 
t = η[-ln(x)]1/β                                                                                                         (3) 
Numerical algorithms may be used if a probability distribution does not have an analytical 
inverse function, for example the central limit theorem can be used to sample from a Normal 
distribution [27]. 
The information for calculating the performance measures is collected during the simulation 
of the computer model. For example, the number of mission ground aborts and air aborts are 
respectively equal to the number of tokens in the place ‘Cancelled mission’ and the number of 
times the transition ‘Mission air abort’ fires. With these data, the mission abort rate, a 
measure of fleet reliability and maintenance performance, can be calculated by [5]: 
Mission abort rate =
Air aborts + Ground aborts
 Total missions required
 ×100%                                 (4) 
Other fleet reliability and maintenance performance measures can be calculated in a similar 
way, by tracking the number of times and durations of certain places being marked during the 
performed simulations. 
A number of simulations are performed and standard statistical techniques used to analyse the 
overall fleet performance. The confidence level of the simulation results depends on the 
number of simulations. Running a large number of simulations will lead to more accurate 
results, but could be time-consuming [28]. However, a large number of simulations may be 
unnecessary if the results reach a desired level of convergence, a threshold for which can be 
specified [28].  
7. Model Application  
To demonstrate the application of the proposed CPN framework, it is applied to an example 
fleet to investigate the effect of maintenance crews on fleet performance and to provide a 
guide for fleet managers to determine staffing level. The fleet consists of 50 identical and 
independent platforms, each of which is comprised of 5 binary-state LRUs that are connected 
in series. Each LRU consists of 2 different series-connected binary-state SRUs. There are 6 
types of SRU in total. The fleet is assumed to perform fixed, identical, daily missions for 5 
years. 45 missions must be performed by the fleet each day. Each mission is performed by 
one FMC platform, starting at 8am and lasting 16 hours. The maximum assignment time for 
each mission is 15 minutes. The fleet is assumed to employ a corrective maintenance policy 
and no preventive maintenance actions are performed.  
 
 Table 3. Example fleet LRU parameters. 
LRU 
Child 
SRUs 
Remove/Install 
time (hour) 
I-level 
repair 
probability 
L1 S1, S3 
Triangle 
(0.1,0.25,0.3) 
0.8 
L2 S2, S4 
Uniform 
(0.5,0.8) 
0.7 
L3 S3, S5 
Triangle 
(0.15,0.3,0.4) 
0.9 
L4 S4, S6 
Triangle 
(0.4,0.5,0.6) 
0.75 
L5 S5, S6 
Triangle 
(0.3,0.35,0.40) 
0.85 
Table 4. Example fleet SRU parameters 
SRU Failure time 
Remove/Install 
time (hour) 
Repair time 
(hour) 
I-level 
repair 
probability 
S1 
Weibull 
(β=1.3, η=2200) 
Triangle 
(3,4,5) 
Uniform 
(120,130) 
0.5 
S2 
Normal 
(µ=1800,σ=23) 
Uniform 
(5.5,6.5) 
Uniform 
(75,80) 
0.7 
S3 
Lognormal, 
(µ=7.6,σ=0.8) 
Triangle 
(4,5,6) 
Uniform 
(135,145) 
0.4 
S4 
Weibull 
(β=1.2, η=1950) 
Triangle 
(3,4.5,5.5) 
Triangle 
(95,100,105) 
0.65 
S5 
Weibull 
(β=1.5, η=2100) 
Triangle 
(3.5,4.5,6) 
Triangle 
(120,130,135) 
0.55 
S6 
Weibull 
(β=1.8, η=2000) 
Triangle 
(3.8,4.6,5.5) 
Triangle 
(110,120,128) 
0.6 
Table 3 shows the distributions relating to LRU removal/installation time, the I-level repair 
probability of LRUs and the relationship between SRUs and LRUs. The distributions relating 
to SRU failure time, SRU removal/installation time and repair time, and the I-level repair 
probability of SRUs are shown in Table 4. The time to repair a failed SRU at the depot is 
assumed to be equal to that at the I-level maintenance organisation. The transportation time 
between the O-level and I-level maintenance organisations is a random variable which 
follows a Triangle distribution (0.3, 0.4, 0.5) hours while that between I-level and D-level 
follows a Triangle distribution (18, 20, 24) hours. The required number of maintenance crews 
to finish any maintenance action is one.  
11 I-level staffing scenarios, where the numbers of I-level maintenance crews vary from 5 to 
15, are studied, assuming infinite O-level and D-level maintenance crews are employed and 
no spares are available. The duties of crews at I-level are the restoration of failed LRUs 
through SRU removal and installation, and SRU repair. When there are a limited number of I-
level maintenance crews available, the maintenance actions at the I-level repair shop are 
performed in the following order: 
1. All possible removals of failed SRUs, 
2. All possible installations of spare SRUs, 
3. All possible repairs of failed SRUs. 
The fleet performance is measured by mission capable rate (MCR, proportion of time that 
platforms in the fleet are capable of performing missions in a given time interval) and mission 
abort rate (MAR, proportion of missions that are not performed successfully due to air aborts 
and ground aborts). 200 simulations were performed, although convergence of results for both 
performance indicators was observed by 100 simulations. Figures 56 and 57 summarise the 
average fleet performance under different staffing scenarios. The simulation results suggest 
that, for the modelled fleet, the fleet performance increases with the number of maintenance 
crews employed at the I-level maintenance organisation. This is expected since more failed 
LRUs and SRUs can be repaired in time when there are more I-level maintenance crews, 
which acts to increase the number of MC platforms and to decrease the number of ground 
 aborts. In addition, when 11 crews are employed at I-level, employing more crews bring no 
benefits to fleet performance. Therefore, it may be not necessary to employ more than 11 
maintenance crews at the I-level maintenance organisation when the budget is limited.  
 
Figure 56. Change of MCR with number of I-level 
maintenance crews 
 
Figure 57. Change of MAR with number of I-level 
maintenance crews 
8. Conclusions    
 The CPN framework proposed in this paper allows the CPN method to be used to model 
fleet operation, aircraft failure, component failure and fleet maintenance processes.   
 After inputting fleet parameters to the CPN model through setting the appropriate initial 
place markings, transition firing delays and arc expressions, the initialised CPN model 
provides an ideal framework for performing a Monte Carlo simulation of modelled fleets.  
 Numerous fleet reliability and maintenance performance measures that are of interest to 
fleet managers can be obtained using information collected during the simulation process. 
 The model can be efficiently modified and extended to model the effect of operation and 
maintenance factors on fleet performance due to its modular nature, which also facilitates 
its future extension to include further operation and maintenance factors that impact fleet 
performance.  
 The CPN framework provides a powerful tool to assist fleet managers in designing, 
managing and optimising fleet maintenance systems. 
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Appendix: Acronyms 
 
CM Corrective Maintenance PM Preventive Maintenance 
LRU Line Replaceable Unit SRU Shop Replaceable Unit  
O-level  Organisation Level  I-level  Intermediate Level 
 D-level Depot Level FiAF Finnish Air Force  
DMT Dual Mode Transmitter PN Petri Nets 
CPN Coloured Petri Nets MC Mission Capable  
NMC Non Mission Capable  FMC Fully Mission Capable  
PMC Partially Mission Capable MEL Minimum Equipment List 
FT Fault Tree TPM Time-based Preventive Maintenance 
 
